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Abstract— In order to assess TV whitespace access scenarios, 
three oligopoly game models are considered and reformulated in 
terms of radio access: Cournot, Stackelberg, and Bertrand.  
Besides revisiting the relevance of Nash and Pareto equilibria, a 
new equilibrium concept – the joint Nash-Pareto equilibrium is 
considered. An evolutionary game equilibria detection method is 
used. The analysis of the simulation results brings relevant 
insights on the issue of autonomy vs. regulation in emerging 
cognitive radio environments.  
Keywords - TV whitespace; dynamic spectrum access; cognitive 
radio; oligopoly game modelling; rules of behaviour. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Current spectrum regimes are based on a highly 
prescriptive approach, centralized control and decisions. The 
administrative approach makes it easier for the regulators to 
ensure avoidance of excessive interference, to tailor 
appropriate license conditions based on guard bands and 
maximum power transmission levels [12]. But traditional 
spectrum planning is valid only for a certain generation of 
technology. It was proved to be a slow process that cannot keep 
up with new innovations and technologies. Studies have shown 
up to 90% of the radio spectrum remains idle in any one 
geographical location [12], [15]. That is the case with TV 
whitespaces. Simulations reported by [17] indicate that the 
DTV whitespaces can provide significantly higher data rates 
compared to the 2.4 GHz ISM band. 
In this paper the problem of harmonized spectrum access in 
TV whitespaces is addressed. Dynamic spectrum access is a 
means of managing spectrum enabled through Cognitive Radio 
[12]. Cognitive radios (CRs) are seen as the solution to the 
current low usage of the radio spectrum [8], [9], [12]. CRs have 
the potential to utilize the unused spectrum in an intelligent 
way while not interfering with other incumbent devices [8], 
[16]. A cognitive radio has to manage a dynamic interaction 
profile in a multi-agent environment. This is a suitable task for 
game theoretic analysis. 
Game Theory has been widely used as an analysis tool in 
economic systems and has recently emerged as an effective 
framework for the analysis and design of wireless networks. 
Radio resource allocation and dynamic spectrum access may be 
described as games between cognitive radios [1], [2], [3], [6]. 
Widely studied game models are exact potential games [7]. The 
most frequently used steady-state concept is the Nash 
Equilibrium (NE) [1], [4], [5]. Yet, there are other equilibria 
that may be relevant for real access scenarios.  
Oligopoly game models are chosen due to the fact that there 
are few spectrum owners and a large number of users. Three 
well known oligopoly games are considered: Cournot, 
Stackelberg, and Bertrand. Besides revisiting the relevance of 
Nash and Pareto equilibria, a new equilibrium concept – the 
joint Nash-Pareto equilibrium is considered, in order to more 
realistically capture radio scene emerging behaviour. 
The paper is structured as follows: Section II provides some 
basic insights to joint game-equilibria generation and detection. 
The reformulation of the game theoretic models for TV 
whitespace access is described in Section III. Section IV 
presents and discusses the numerical results obtained from 
simulations. The conclusions are presented in Section V. 
II. GAME EQUILIBRIA GENERATION AND DETECTION 
A game may be defined as a system G = ((N, Si, ui), i = 
1,…, n) where: 
(i) N represents the set of n players, N = {1,…, n}. 
(ii) for each player i є N, Si represents the set of actions Si = 
{si1, si2, …, sim}; S = S1 x S2 x … x SN is the set of all possible 
game situations; 
(iii) for each player i є N, ui :S → R represents the payoff 
function. 
A strategy profile (strategy or action vector) is a vector 
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Informally, a strategy profile is an NE if no player can 
improve her payoff by unilateral deviation. 
Considering two strategy profiles x and y from S, the 
strategy profile x is said to Pareto dominate the strategy profile 
y (and we write x < P y) if the payoff of each player using 
strategy x is greater or equal to the payoff associated to 
strategy y and at least one payoff is strictly greater. The set of 
all non-dominated strategies (Pareto frontier) represents the set 
of Pareto equilibria of the game [5]. 
In an n-player game consider that each player i acts based 
on a certain type of rationality ri, i = 1,…, n. We may consider 
a two-player game where r1 = Nash and r2 = Pareto. The first 
player is biased towards the Nash equilibrium and the other 
one is Pareto-biased. Thus, a new type of equilibrium, called 
the joint Nash-Pareto equilibrium, may be considered [4]. The 
considered generalization involves heterogeneous players that 
are biased towards different equilibrium types or may act 
based on different types of rationality [4]. 
Let us consider an n player game where each player may be 
either Nash or Pareto-biased. We denote by IN the set of Nash 
biased players (N-players) and by IP the set of Pareto biased 
players (P-players). Therefore we have 
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An operator for measuring the relative efficiency of profile 
strategies has been introduced [5].  
,: NSSE   
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E(x, y) measures the relative efficiency of the strategy profile x 
with respect to the strategy profile y. The relative efficiency 
enables us to define a generative relation for the joint Nash-
Pareto (NP) equilibrium. 
Consider a relation <NP defined as y <NP x if and only if 
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The relation <NP is considered as the generative relation of 
the joint Nash-Pareto equilibrium. 
An evolutionary technique for equilibria detection, based 
on appropriate generative relations [4] that allow the 
comparison of strategies, is considered.  
Numerical experiments aim the detection of pure equilibria 
or a combination of equilibria paralleling cognitive radios 
interaction. An adaptation of the popular NSGA2 [11] has been 
considered. 
III. OLIGOPOLY MODELS FOR TV WHITESPACE ACCESS 
In order to assess whitespace access scenarios, three 
oligopoly game models are considered and reformulated in 
terms of radio access: Cournot, Stackelberg, and Bertrand [5]. 
An oligopoly is a market form in which a market or industry is 
dominated by a small number of sellers (oligopolists). 
In the Cournot economic competition model players 
simultaneously choose quantities. In the Stackelberg model 
they move sequentially (some have priority) and in Bertrand's 
oligopoly they simultaneously choose prices [5]. The 
commodity of this oligopoly market is the frequency spectrum. 
In order to illustrate spectrum access situations, scenarios with 
two radios trying to access the same whitespace (set of 
channels) are considered. Radio strategies and payoffs are 
represented two-dimensionally. 
A. Cournot spectrum access modelling  
We consider a general spectrum access scenario that can be 
modelled as a reformulation of the Cournot oligopoly game 
[1], [5]. Suppose there are n radios attempting to access the 
same whitespace at the same time. Each radio i may decide the 
number   ,0ic of simultaneous channels to access. The 
question is how many simultaneous channels should each 
radio access in order to maximize its operation efficiency in a 
harmonized manner? 
Based on the above scenario, a Cournot game can be 
reformulated according to Table 1: 
TABLE I.  COURNOT GAME REFORMULATION 
Players  cognitive radios attempting to access a certain whitespace W; 
Actions  the strategy of each player i is the number ci of simultaneous 
accessed channels;  
A strategy profile is a vector c = ( c1,…,cn). 
Payoffs  the difference between a function of goodput P(c)ci and the 
cost of accessing ci simultaneous channels Kci. 
 
We consider a linear inverse demand function in which the 
number of non-interfered symbols P(c) is determined from the 
total number ci of accessed channels (occupied bandwidth). 
The demand function can be defined as: 
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, is the aggregate number of accessed channels. 
The goodput for radio i is P(c)ci . Radio i’s cost for 
supporting ci simultaneous channels is Ci(ci) .  
The payoff of radio i may then be written as: 
)()()( iiii cCccPcu  . 
In general, P decreases with the total number of 
implemented channels and Ci increases with ci (more 
bandwidth implies more processing resources and more power 
consumption) [1]. If these effects are approximated as linear 
functions, the payoff function can be rewritten as 
ii
n
k
ki KcccWcu 





 
1
)( , 
where   
W is the whitespace (set of available channels),   
K is the cost of accessing one channel.  
 
The Nash equilibrium is considered as the solution of this 
game and can be calculated as follows: 
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B. Stackelberg spectrum access modelling 
A spectrum access situation where we have incumbent 
monopoly (licensed users) and new entrants (unlicensed), may 
well be modelled using a Stackelberg game model where the 
users move sequentially (one has priority over the other).  
The Stackelberg reformulation of the game is captured by 
Table II: 
TABLE II.  STACKELBERG GAME REFORMULATION 
Players  the cognitive radios – licensed and unlicensed (primary and 
secondary) users attempting to access a set of channels; 
Actions  the strategy of each player i is the number ci of accessed 
channels;  
Payoffs  the difference between a function of goodput and the cost of 
accessing ci channels. 
 
Using the same notations as for Cournot modelling, the 
payoff function of user i, in case of Stackelberg model, can be 
defined as 
),()(),( 2121 iidii cCccPcccu   for i = 1,2. 
considering c2 = b2(c1) as the output of the secondary user for 
primary user’s output c1 [6]. We consider a constant unit cost 
and a linear inverse demand function Pd(c) with the same 
definition as for the Cournot model.  
   The outcome of the equilibrium [5] is that radio 1 
accesses )(
2
1*
1 KWc   simultaneous channels and radio 2 
accesses )(
4
1
)( *12
*
2 KWcbc  simultaneous channels. 
C. Bertrand spectrum access modelling 
In the Bertrand competition, producers compete by varying 
the product price and thus adjusting the demand. A constant 
unit cost and linear demand function are assumed. The 
Bertrand competition for whitespace access may be 
reformulated as captured by Table III. 
We consider n cognitive radios competing for access to ci 
channels, in a given whitespace W. The objective of each radio 
is to activate a subset of channels in order to satisfy its current 
demand level (e.g. target throughput). Using the same 
notations as for Cournot and Stackelberg models, the payoff 
function of radio i can be defined as 
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TABLE III.   BERTRAND GAME REFORMULATION 
Players  the cognitive radios  attempting to access the whitespace 
Actions  the strategy of each player i is a target number pi(c) of non-
interfered symbols;  
Payoffs  the difference between a function of goodput and the cost of 
accessing ci simultaneous channels. 
IV. NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS 
The results represent a sub-set of more extensive 
simulations. For equilibria detection the evolutionary 
technique from [4] is considered. A population of 100 
strategies has been evolved using a rank based fitness 
assignment technique. In all experiments the process 
converges in less than 20 generations. Our tests show that the 
evolutionary method for equilibrium detection is scalable with 
respect to the number of available channels [13]. 
The simulation parameters for all the three models – 
Cournot, Stackelberg, and Bertrand – are W = 10 (available 
channels) and K = 1 (cost of accessing one channel). 
A. Cournot modelling – numerical experiments 
Model evaluation results are presented for the Cournot 
competition with two radios trying to access the same 
whitespace at the same time. The emerging behaviour of the 
radio scene is captured by the detected equilibria (Fig. 1): 
Nash, Pareto, Nash-Pareto, and Pareto-Nash. The four types of 
equilibria are obtained in separate runs. 
The NE corresponds to the scenario where each of the two 
CRs activates 3 channels (from 10 available). The Pareto 
equilibrium describes a more unbalanced situation where the 
number of active channels for each CR lies in the range [0, 
4.5].  
Although each CR tries to maximize its utility, none of 
them can access more than half of the available channels. The 
NE indicates the maximum number of channels a Nash-biased 
CR may access without decreasing its payoff (Fig. 2). 
In some cases, the Nash-Pareto strategy enables the CR to 
access more channels than for the NE strategy. In the 
performed experiments the PN equilibrium is symmetric to the 
NP equilibrium with respect to the first bisecting line. It is 
interesting to notice that none of the NP strategies actually 
reach NE. 
Fig. 2 illustrates the payoffs of the two players u1(c1, c2) 
and u2(c1, c2), for the Cournot modeling. 
The payoffs of P-players are in the range [0, 20] and their 
sum is always larger than the NE payoff (9,9). The Nash-
player’s payoff is smaller in a Nash-Pareto situation than in a 
case where all the players are Nash-biased. 
Even if the NP strategies allow the CRs to access more 
channels, the payoffs are smaller than for the Pareto strategies. 
This is due to interference increasing with the number of 
accessed channels. 
 
Figure 1.  Cournot modelling – two radios (W = 10, K = 1). Evolutionary 
detected equilibria: Nash (3,3), Pareto, Nash-Pareto, and Pareto-Nash 
 
Figure 2.  Cournot modelling – two radios (W = 10, K = 1). Payoffs of the 
evolutionary detected equilibria: Nash (9, 9), Pareto, NP, and PN. 
B. Stackelberg modelling – numerical experiments 
The evolutionary detected Nash, Pareto, NP, and PN 
equilibria are captured in Fig. 3. We may notice that any 
strategy from the Pareto front is also an NP strategy. If the 
primary user plays Nash, then the secondary user may 
maximize its payoff by choosing any strategy. If the secondary 
user plays Nash then the maximum payoff of the primary user 
is NE (10.13, 5.06) (Fig.4).  
Even if the secondary user can access less channels than in 
the Cournot case – c2 = 2.25 (Fig.3) which is less than three 
channels, NE = (3,3) (Fig.1), its maximum payoff remains 
unaffected, 20 (Fig.4). Instead, the primary user’s maximum 
payoff is half, 10, even if it accesses more channels (c1 = 4.5). 
For the Stackelberg formulation of the game, the NE payoff of 
the secondary user (Fig. 4) is less then in the Cournot case (5 
instead of 9). For the primary user the NE payoff is slightly 
increased (10.13 instead of 9) compared to Cournot. 
 
Figure 3.  Stackelberg modelling – two radios (W=10, K=1). Evolutionary 
detected equilibria: Nash (4.25, 2.25), Pareto, Nash-Pareto, and Pareto-Nash. 
 
Figure 4.  Stackelberg modelling – two radios (W=10, K=1). Payoffs of the 
evolutionary detected equilibria: Nash (10.13, 5.06), Pareto, NP=Nash, and 
PN=Pareto. 
This situation is relevant for interference control in 
dynamic spectrum access scenarios between incumbents and 
new entrants. The analysis shows that payoffs are maximized 
for all users if the incumbents are Nash oriented and the new 
entrants are Pareto driven. 
C. Bertrand modelling – numerical experiments 
We think the Bertrand oligopoly is suitable for modelling 
crowded spectrum access scenarios and the reformulation is as 
follows. The Bertrand strategy is the price. The equivalent of 
the price P(c) in this game reformulation is the target number 
of non-interfered symbols of each radio. The lower this target 
is the higher the chances are for the radio to access one or 
several channels. On the other hand, as the number P(c) of 
non-interfered symbols per channel decreases, the need for 
channels (the demand) increases. Thus, a radio willing to 
maximize its goodput will attempt to occupy as many low-rate 
channels as possible. Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 qualitatively illustrate 
the winning situations for two radios trying to access a limited 
bandwidth W. The NE in this case means zero payoff for each 
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radio while the Pareto strategy ensures the maximum possible 
payoff for one radio at a time. This indicates that, for a high 
interference scene, some sort of scheduling or sequential 
access scheme is required.  
 
Figure 5.  Bertrand modelling – two radios (W=10, K=1).  Evolutionary 
detected equilibria: Nash (1, 1), Pareto. 
 
Figure 6.  Bertrand modelling – two radios (W=10, K=1).  Payoffs of the 
evolutionary detected equilibria: Nash (0, 0), Pareto, NP, and PN. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
In order to investigate the relevance of certain game 
equilibrium concepts for the problem of dynamic spectrum 
access in cognitive radio environments three oligopoly game 
models were considered. Besides the standard Nash 
equilibrium new equilibrium concepts were investigated: the 
Pareto equilibrium and the joint Nash-Pareto equilibrium. The 
Nash equilibrium indicates the maximum number of channels 
a Nash-biased CR may access without decreasing its payoff. 
The analysis of the Stackelberg modelling shows that payoffs 
are maximized for all users if the incumbents are Nash 
oriented and the new entrants are Pareto driven. The Bertrand 
model proves valuable in estimating the chances in a win-lose 
situation, in a very crowded spectrum. The observations may 
be especially relevant for designing new rules of behaviour for 
heterogeneous radio environments. 
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